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The Impact of Statistical Discrimination in 
Shared Housing Markets 
A Correspondence Study on Ethnic Discrimination in Germany
Jascha Dräger
GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Existing research found strong and convincing evidence of ethnic discrimination 
in housing markets in almost all Western countries (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). 
This also holds for Germany, where particularly applicants with Turkish or Arabic 
names face severe discrimination. In large German cities applicants with Turkish 
names get up to 16 percentage points fewer responses than applicants with Ger-
man names (Auspurg, Hinz, & Schmid, 2017). However, almost all of these studies 
look at “traditional” housing markets, where a landlord rents a flat to a family 
or individuals. Another segment of the housing market is mostly ignored, even 
though it has become increasingly common: Shared housing. About five million 
Germans are currently living in shared flats (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 
2017, p. 12). Discrimination in this market likely differs from other housing markets 
because of differences in the recruiting process and differences in the rationales 
and composition of tenants.
Firstly, shared flats likely differ in the 
prevalence of ethnic discrimination. 
Usually, tenants who currently live in a 
flat, instead of the landlord, are in charge 
of recruiting new tenants (Diehl, Andor-
fer, Khoudja, & Krause, 2013). Contrary to 
renting a flat, new tenants directly affect 
the life of the other tenants, as they inter-
act on a daily basis. Moreover, while the 
law in Germany prohibits ethnic discrim-
ination, it is difficult to prove that deci-
sions regarding an individual case were 
based on prejudices held against ethnic 
minorities. On the other hand, self-se-
lection into shared flats might reduce 
discrimination. It can be assumed that 
people who live in shared flats have 
on average fewer prejudices against 
minorities than people living in other 
housing arrangements. For instance, a 
large share of university students dwell 
in shared flats and students report on 
average fewer prejudices against minori-
ties. Which of these effects dominate 
remains an empirical question. The few 
existing studies on the shared housing 
market found ethnic discrimination in 
the UK (Carlsson & Eriksson, 2015) and 
the US (Gaddis & Ghoshal, 2015), but no 
evidence for discrimination in Germany 
(Diehl et al., 2013).
Secondly, the selection process and, 
thus, discrimination in shared flats is 
likely to differ from other housing mar-
kets because of the daily interaction 
between co-tenants. Ethnic discrimina-
tion in housing markets is often explained 
by so-called statistical discrimination 
(Phelps, 1972).  Statistical discrimination 
means that landlords have incomplete 
information about applicants and use 
perceived group means to approximate 
missing information. The reason for the 
occurrence of statistical discrimination 
in the “traditional” housing market is 
that landlords assume systematic ethnic 
differences in applicants’ ability to pay 
the rent and whether they take care of 
the flat or house (Ahmed, Andersson, & 
Hammarsted, 2010). However, the con-
cept of statistical discrimination likely 
differs in shared housing markets. As 
the two main motives for flat sharing 
are saving money and socialising with 
flatmates (Steinführer & Haase, 2009), 
social considerations about applicants 
play a bigger role in this market. Factors 
that are normally interpreted as a taste 
for discrimination may enter statisti-
cal discrimination. Thus, a potential 
explanation for ethnic discrimination 
in shared housing markets may be that 
tenants assume systematic differences 
in how well they get along (hereafter 
“sociability”) between applicants of dif-
ferent ethnicities. 
However, selection criteria for appli-
cants will crucially depend on who is 
recruiting the new tenant. In most cases, 
this decision falls on the current tenants 
of the shared flat and the landlord plays 
only a minor role. In some cases though, 
landlords are directly recruiting new ten-
ants for available rooms.
Thus, the goal of this article is three-
fold. Firstly, I assess whether ethnic 
discrimination against applicants with 
Turkish names exists in the market for 
shared flats in Germany. Secondly, I 
evaluate whether ethnic discrimination 
can be explained by statistical discrim-
ination. Thirdly, I analyse differences 
between different types of recruiters. 
To do this, I create fake applicants with 
typical German or Turkish names, apply 
for rooms offered on a popular website 
for shared housing (wg-gesucht.de), 
and compare the responses to these 
applications. I evaluate statistical dis-
crimination by randomly varying the 
information given in the application. 
Applicants give either no specific infor-
mation about themselves, signal that 
they have enough financial resources, 
or signal sociability.
Theory
Research on ethnic discrimination dis-
tinguishes two types of discrimination. 
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Statistical discrimination arises because 
decision makers have incomplete infor-
mation about the applicants (e.g., their 
income) and use perceived group means 
to replace missing information (Phelps, 
1972). Statistical discrimination should 
disappear when applicants provide 
relevant information. To test statisti-
cal discrimination, researchers have 
included additional information about 
the applicant (e.g., employment status 
or occupation). Although adding positive 
information increases the proportion of 
responses and invitations, only some 
authors find a discrimination reducing 
effect of adding information (e.g., Bosch, 
Carnero, & Farré, 2010), while others find 
similar discrimination (e.g., Ahmed et 
al., 2010). Taste-based discrimination 
means that decision-makers prefer an 
applicant from a specific ethnic group 
even if applicants are known to be equal 
with regard to all other characteristics 
(Becker, 1957).
I assume similar motives for dis-
crimination in shared flats, except for 
one important difference; The tenants 
of the shared flat usually screen the 
applications they received and invite all 
applicants they like to viewings to get to 
know them better. Flats with a sufficient 
number of applications will only invite 
the subset of applicants whom they like 
most. Based on the two main motiva-
tions to live in a shared flat, saving costs 
and socialising (Steinführer & Haase, 
2009), I assume that tenants base this 
initial decision on two criteria: financial 
considerations and social considerations 
about the applicants. 
Much like landlords in the traditional 
housing markets, tenants will consider 
how likely it is that applicants will pay 
the rent regularly. Furthermore, tenants 
may consider if applicants will be able 
to contribute to purchasing and main-
taining household appliances. Tenants 
will not invite applicants if there is the 
risk that applicants might not be able 
to do so, because in that case, current 
tenants may have to compensate for 
missing payments or search for a new 
tenant again. Since tenants do not know 
the financial situation of the applicant, 
they will look for indicators in the appli-
cation like labour market status or occu-
pation. If applicants do not provide this 
information in the application, tenants 
may either eliminate the applicant from 
the selection process or look for indirect 
indicators of financial resources. 
At this point, statistical discrimina-
tion based on financial considerations 
can come into play. Tenants may not 
invite a Turkish applicant because they 
assume that being of Turkish origin is 
associated with having fewer financial 
resources. Thus, without having spe-
cific knowledge about the applicants, 
tenants may assume that the average 
German applicant will be more likely 
to pay their rent regularly than a typical 
Turkish applicant. This process is very 
similar to statistical discrimination in 
other housing markets.
However, more important for the 
choice of a flatmate may be how well 
tenants get along in everyday life. This 
includes whether the new tenant will 
contribute to domestic chores, cares for 
shared goods, has similar expectations 
regarding closeness and socialising, and 
has similar values and common interests 
(Clark, 2017). Again, tenants will prefer a 
flatmate they presume has these char-
acteristics and will do a preliminary 
selection based on the information 
they get from the applications. Yet, it is 
less certain what tenants will look for. 
Applicants may be favoured if they have 
already lived in a shared flat and give 
some information about their social life 
and hobbies. Like with financial consid-
erations, tenants will either not invite an 
applicant who is not providing enough 
information or they will look for proxies 
of sociability.
One of these proxies could be the 
perceived origin of the applicant. As Ger-
mans feel strong cultural and social dif-
ferences to Turkish immigrants (Blohm 
& Wasmer, 2008), German tenants may 
anticipate problems in everyday inter-
actions. For instance, tenants may fear 
that they can celebrate fewer parties in 
the flat (Diehl et al., 2013, p. 1684). Under 
these circumstances, statistical discrim-
ination based on social consideration 
may happen: Tenants assume that the 
average German applicant is a better 
co-tenant than the average Turkish 
applicant because the average German 
applicant is more likely to have similar 
attitudes and expectations regarding 
the daily flat life. Contrary to statistical 
discrimination based on financial con-
siderations, statistical discrimination 
based on social considerations is very 
specific to the shared flat market. 
Even if statistical discrimination does 
not occur, there may still be taste-based 
discrimination. Some tenants feel more 
comfortable in interaction with persons 
of their own ethnicity and prefer to avoid 
contact with ethnic minorities.
Thus, there are three potential 
motives for discrimination in shared 
flats: 1) Statistical discrimination based 
on financial considerations; 2) Statistical 
discrimination based on social consider-
ations; or 3) taste-based discrimination 
or any combination of these. I expect 
ethnic discrimination in the shared 
housing market because there exist 
some preferences for German co-ten-
ants, even among students (Diehl et al., 
2013).
Hypothesis 1: Applicants with Turkish 
names will receive fewer invitations to 
viewings than applicants with German 
names.
However, applicants can reduce 
discrimination by giving more infor-
mation about themselves. When the 
decision-makers have enough reliable 
information about the applicant’s finan-
cial credibility or his sociability, they do 
not have to rely on ethnicity as a proxy 
for it. Statistical discrimination based on 
expected differences in financial credi-
bility or sociability will vanish. 
Hypothesis 2: Signalling financial 
credibility will reduce discrimination 
against applicants with Turkish names.
Hypothesis 3: Signalling sociability 
will reduce discrimination against appli-
cants with Turkish names.
Depending on the characteristics of 
the shared flat, the effectivity of these 
two strategies will vary. Decision-mak-
ers weight different signals according to 
their rationale for renting the flat. When 
a landlord recruits the new tenant, 
financial aspects will be more important 
because landlords will rarely have direct 
contact with the new tenant and are 
mostly interested in maximising profit. 
Thus, landlords will mostly respond to 
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financial signals. On the other hand, 
tenants will interact regularly with their 
new co-tenant and are likely putting 
more emphasis on expected sociabil-
ity. Contrary to the analysis of ethnic 
discrimination and the role of statistical 
discrimination in it, I cannot manipulate 
the type of recruiter in the experiment. 
Thus, the type of recruiter is proba-
bly correlated with other differences 
between flats. Therefore, the analysis 
of how different types of recruiters react 
to different signals in the application 
should be interpreted as explorative.
Methods
Procedure
To test the proposed hypotheses, I con-
ducted a correspondence study where 
I applied with fake applications for 
advertisements of shared flats posted 
on the popular website wg-gesucht.de. 
I manipulated the ethnicity of applicants 
as well as information given in the appli-
cation and evaluated how these factors 
affected responses.
I manipulated ethnicity by the name 
of the applicants. The fake applicants 
are named Dominik Binder, Nico Heller 
(signalling a German applicant), Murat 
Arslan, and Mustafa Ceylan (signalling 
a Turkish applicant;  Schmid, 2015, 
pp. 64–65). For each applicant, I created 
an account on wg-gesucht.de and an 
email address. With these accounts I 
applied for the offered rooms. 
I manipulated information by sending 
applications that contained either no 
specific information about the applicant 
or by adding information that should 
reduce uncertainty about the applicant’s 
financial or social characteristics. The 
basic message (no specific information) 
included only a greeting, a statement 
that the applicant is interested in renting 
the room, a request for a viewing, and the 
first name of the applicant. The financial 
credibility message added a sentence 
about the occupation of the applicant 
to the basic applications. Applicants 
introduced themselves as engineers 
or architects. The sociability message 
added to the basic message information 
about the applicant’s leisure activities, 
a preference for socialising with co-ten-
ants, companionable attributes, and 
positive experiences in shared flats.
I sent two applications to each flat, 
one with a Turkish name and one with a 
German name. The type of information 
is allowed to differ between applica-
tions within flats. To keep participants 
unaware of the experiment, I sent mes-
sages that had slightly different content 
but signalled similar qualities of the 
applicant.1 The two applications to each 
advertisement were sent with a time 
difference of 60-120 minutes. I assigned 
order and version of the messages ran-
domly. The person who offers the flat 
(hereafter “contact person”) received 
the message via email and responded 
via email. 
Participants
In the experiment, I included all adver-
tisements for vacant rooms in shared 
flats in Mannheim, Germany that had 
been uploaded on wg-gesucht.de 
between March 16th and April 25th, 2018. 
Advertisements were only included if 
the standardised applications roughly 
matched the criteria mentioned in 
the advertisement. I excluded adver-
tisements if restricted to women, to 
students, were only rented until a fixed 
date,  did not include a description in 
German, explicitly demanded applica-
tions via phone call, or if the contact 
person already received an application 
for another room.
In total, I sent applications to 208 
advertisements. For two advertisements, 
I sent only one application because the 
advertisement was deactivated before 
I could send the second application. 
Mannheim is an interesting city for the 
experiment because more than 40 % of 
its inhabitants have a migration back-
ground, and nearly 9 % of its inhabitants 
are of Turkish origin (Stadt Mannheim, 
2017). Both values are way above the 
average of German cities.
Measures
The exact responses to the applications 
are registered. I coded the responses in 
four categories: (1) a direct or indirect 
invitation to a viewing (e.g., by offering 
or asking for a date for a viewing); (2) a 
rejection (e.g., “We already found a new 
tenant”); (3) other responses (e.g., flats 
asking for more information about the 
applicant); and (4) no response. 
Following Ahmed and colleagues 
(2010), I collapsed these categories into 
three binary measures for the analysis. 
Firstly, I analysed how the manipulated 
factors affect the probability of getting 
any response. Secondly, I differenti-
ated between positive responses that 
permit further contact (invitation, 
other response) versus those that do 
not (rejection, no response). Thirdly, I 
distinguished between invitations and 
non-invitations. I will primarily focus on 
invitations because applicants who get 
other responses particularly ask for fur-
ther information to reduce uncertainty 
about the characteristics of applicants.  
I infer the role of the contact person 
from the free self-description in the 
advertisement and responses of the 
contact person. Contact persons are 
categorised as either: (1) tenant, who 
stays in the flat; (2) tenant, who moves 
out of the flat; or (3) landlord.
Results
Ethnic Discrimination
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 
treatment variables and the respective 
percentages of any responses, positive 
responses, and invitations at the appli-
cation level. Of the 414 applications, 
57% received some kind of response, 
51% received a positive response, and 
about 36% received an invitation. Yet, 
there are big differences in the response 
rates by ethnicity of the applicants. 
While applicants with German names 
received some response to 69% of their 
applications and invitations to 47% of 
their applications, the respective num-
bers for applicants with Turkish names 
are 45% and 26%. 
Furthermore, responses vary by 
the kind of information the applicants 
gave in the application. Applicants who 
mentioned a high-paid job (financial 
information) or mentioned hobbies and 
companionable attributes (social infor-
mation) got much more responses and 
invitations than applicants who gave no 
specific information. Only 24% of con-
tact persons were landlords, while about 
38% of contact persons were tenants 
who were moving out of the flat and 38% 
are tenants who were staying in the flat.
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Ethnic discrimination is also con-
firmed in a random-intercept logistic 
regression which accounts for the 
clustering of applications in flats and 
the order and the version of the appli-
cations: Applicants with Turkish names 
get 20 percentage points fewer invita-
tions when compared to the applicants 
with German names (see Table 2, model 
1). This difference is highly significant. 
Adding social information increases the 
invitation rate by 21 percentage points 
while adding financial information 
increases the invitation rate by 13 per-
centage points.
The Role of Statistical 
Discrimination
After having shown that shared flats 
discriminate against applicants with 
Turkish names, I evaluated whether 
additional information reduces dis-
crimination by adding the interaction 
between ethnicity and type of infor-
mation to the regression (see model 2). 
Adding social information increases the 
proportion of invitations to applicants 
with German names by 16 percentage 
points, while adding financial informa-
tion increases responses and invitations 
by 4 percentage points. Applicants with 
Turkish names gain even more from 
additional information as indicated by 
the positive estimates for the interaction 
term between ethnicity and informa-
tion. The difference in invitation rate by 
ethnicity is smaller when applicants give 
additional information. Adding social 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics and conditional responses
Number of 
Applications
Any Response   
(in %)
Positive Response 
(in %)
Invitation 
(in %)
Ethnicity
German 206 69.4 66.0 47.1
Turkish 208 45.2 36.5 25.5
Information
None 138 46.4 41.3 24.6
Financial 138 60.1 52.2 39.1
Social 138 65.2 60.1 44.9
Contact Person
Tenant (stays) 156 57.7 50.0 34.0
Tenant (moves) 158 53.8 51.2 41.8
Landlord 100 62.0 53.0 31.0
Total 414 57.2 51.2 36.2
information reduces discrimination by 
11 percentage points (which equals a 
reduction by one-third compared to 
the “no information” message) while 
mentioning a high-paid job reduces 
discrimination by 20 percentage points 
(a reduction by two-thirds). Thus, the 
discrimination reducing effect seems 
to be bigger for financial than for social 
information. 
However, only the interaction 
between ethnicity and financial informa-
tion is statistically significant. Yet, I inter-
pret this finding as (tentative) support 
for hypotheses two and three because 
of the substantial effects sizes. Both, 
adding information about the financial 
resources and the sociability of the 
applicant, reduce discrimination against 
applicants with Turkish names. The sum 
of the effects of social and financial infor-
mation implies no discrimination. Thus, 
statistical discrimination would account 
for total discrimination. 
Statistical Discrimination by Type 
of Contact Person
Until now, I have only looked at the 
average discrimination reducing effect 
of additional information. However, dif-
ferent types of contact persons may dif-
ferently react to additional information 
because they have different rationales. 
The findings for discrimination regarding 
invitations are summarised in Figure 1. It 
shows the difference in the proportion 
of invitations between applicants with 
Turkish and German names by type of 
contact person. A value of zero would 
mean that there is no discrimination. 
Negative values imply discrimination 
against applicants with Turkish names, 
whereas positive values imply discrimi-
nation against applicants with German 
names. 
There are substantial differences by 
type of contact person. Tenants who 
stay in the shared flat show high levels 
of discrimination against applicants 
with Turkish names for all types of 
information. Adding social information 
(dark-blue bars) reduces discrimination 
by about 18 percentage points while 
adding financial information (light-blue 
bars) does not affect discrimination for 
this subgroup. For tenants who move 
out of the flat, adding financial infor-
mation reduces discrimination most (20 
percentage points). Adding social infor-
mation slightly reduces discrimination. 
Table 2  Random-intercept logistic regression of invitations on treatment 
characteristics (AMEs, standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2
Turkish name -0.203*** -0.311***
(0.031) (0.071)
Social information 0.206*** 0.163**
(0.048) (0.069)
Financial information 0.129*** 0.042
(0.047) (0.068)
Turkish name * social Information - 0.108
(0.099)
Turkish name * financial Information - 0.196*
(0.108)
Applications 414 414
Flats 208 208
Further control variables: version and order of applications. Reference categories: German name, no 
specific information. Significance levels: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
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Therefore, whether the contact person 
and the applicant will actually live 
together is an important determinant of 
(statistical) discrimination. Tenants who 
stay in the flat are the only group that will 
live together with the new tenant and, 
therefore, are more interested in the 
social characteristics of the applicant. 
On the other side, tenants who move 
out will not have much contact with the 
applicant. Thereby, they may predomi-
nantly be interested in avoiding financial 
problems. 
When landlords offer the room, dis-
crimination against applicants with Turk-
ish names vanishes completely if they 
give any kind of specific information. 
Landlords even favour applicants with 
Turkish names under these conditions. 
However, these results are based on few 
observations and may have occurred by 
chance. 
Discussion
In this paper, I extend the existing litera-
ture by assessing ethnic discrimination 
in a market for shared housing and by 
evaluating the role of statistical discrim-
ination. I theorise that ethnic discrimi-
nation is partially caused by statistical 
discrimination regarding financial and 
social characteristics of applicants. I 
evaluate this hypothesis by conduct-
ing a correspondence study in which I 
manipulated ethnicity and information 
given in the application. 
The results show unambiguously 
that many shared flats discriminate 
against applicants with Turkish names. 
Applicants with Turkish names get 20 
percentage points fewer invitations to 
viewings than applicants with German 
names. Therefore, ethnic discrimina-
tion in the shared housing market in 
Mannheim is even more frequent than 
ethnic discrimination in the “traditional” 
rental housing market in other German 
cities, where applicants with Turkish 
names get between 9 and 16 percent-
age points fewer responses (Auspurg 
et al., 2017). A reason for this may be 
that a bad co-tenant will not only result 
in monetary costs but also reduce the 
quality of life in general because of the 
daily interaction. However, a competing 
explanation for the high prevalence of 
discrimination could also be the context 
of Mannheim, for instance, the high pro-
portion of inhabitants with a migration 
background. 
Additionally, I show that adding infor-
mation about an applicant’s occupation 
as well as social characteristics reduces 
discrimination. However, a comparison 
of these two aspects of statistical dis-
crimination is problematic. Even though I 
tried to send distinctive signals for finan-
cial and social considerations, contact 
persons may use the occupation to infer 
information about sociability and vice 
versa. For instance, mentioning employ-
ment also affects social considerations 
about the applicant, like availability for 
leisure activities. Future research should 
include a combination of a financial and 
a social signal as another treatment to 
test this possibility. 
In a third step, I assessed whether 
landlords and tenants differently react 
to additional information. Tenants who 
stay in the flat only reduce discrimina-
tion when getting information regarding 
sociability. Tenants who move out of 
the flat only react to the financial signal. 
Landlords do not discriminate when 
applicants give any kind of specific 
information. However, these results are 
tentative as the number of observations 
in these subgroups is very small. 
To conclude, I will shortly discuss 
two ideas that may reduce discrimina-
tion in shared housing markets. Gaddis 
and Ghoshal (2015, p. 296) propose that 
websites could hide names in applica-
tions until the contact person gives a 
response. Alternatively, websites could 
hide the applicant’s name in the head-
ing of the message. This way, contact 
persons have to read the application 
and will not delete messages after just 
reading the heading. Names would be 
less salient.
Even though more research is needed, 
the finding that ethnic discrimination 
in shared housing markets is partially 
caused by statistical discrimination 
based on social considerations can help 
to reduce discrimination. Customers 
make similar considerations in other 
sharing markets. Knowledge about the 
selection criteria will help hosts and 
applicants to avoid discrimination by 
countering prejudices through more 
information. This is especially helpful 
for second or third generation migrants, 
who are culturally assimilated to the eth-
nic majority but are still discriminated 
against because of prejudices. In a sec-
ond step, this may reduce prejudices and 
discrimination through more interethnic 
contact. 
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